Do negotiated tariffs under the WTO deviate significantly from the first-best agreement? If so, why? To answer these questions, we consider two potential causes of deviation from the first-best in WTO negotiations: (i) a free-riding problem that may be caused by the WTO's nondiscrimination requirement, and (ii) asymmetric information about government preferences. Theories based on the above two causes generate starkly different predictions about the relationship between import market power and negotiated tariffs. Using WTO tariff data, we find that the pattern of negotiated tariffs is consistent with the implication of a negotiation model under asymmetric information. The freeriding problem appears to have a weak effect. JEL Classification: F13, D82, D02 * We would like to thank Filomena Garcia and Volodymyr Lugovskyy for their comments and suggestions.
Introduction
The Terms-of-Trade (ToT) theory postulates that import tariffs could improve a country's ToT by dampening the world price of its imports. The ToT effects, however, are inefficient since they generate bigger losses for the affected exporting countries than gains for the importing country. Therefore, assuming efficient negotiations, a standard ToT analysis implies that any variation in negotiated tariffs should solely reflect the political-economy preferences of the governments across products-i.e., negotiated tariffs must be independent of the import market power of the importing country (Bagwell and Staiger 1999 , 2002 and Grossman and Helpman 1995 .
Recent empirical studies claim that the WTO agreement has not fully neutralized the ToT effects. Nevertheless, these studies have conflicting results such that both positive and negative relationships between import market power and negotiated tariffs have been reported. Ludema and Mayda (2013) report a positive relationship between negotiated tariffs and a measure of import market power. 1 They argue that the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause of the GATT/WTO created a free-riding problem in negotiations that resulted in a suboptimal agreement in which ToT effects are not fully neutralized. As a result, the negotiated tariffs must be increasing in the import market power of the importing countries, especially in products where the free-riding problem is more severe.
In a sharp contrast, based on a delegation theory of tariffs Staiger 2005 and Amador and Bagwell 2013) , Beshkar, Bond, and Rho (2015) argue that if governments care about flexibility in setting their trade policy (due to uncertain political-economy preferences, for example), the optimally-negotiated tariffs must depend negatively on the importing country's import market power. That is because in these environments, a tradeoff arises between flexibility and externality such that higher negotiated tariffs offer more flexibility while at the same time open the door for greater negative externality from tariffs. Therefore, in products with greater ToT externalities, it is optimal to negotiate lower tariffs. Our objective in this paper is to evaluate, both theoretically and empirically, the potential roles that the MFN-driven free-riding and the flexibility-externality tradeoff play in the design of trade agreements.
To this end, we extend the analyses of Ludema and Mayda (2013) and Beshkar, Bond, and Rho (2015) by proposing a model that incorporates the potential role of free riding in the tradeoff between flexibility and externality. Our model, therefore, suggests a framework to compare the empirical relevance of the opposing patterns predicted by the flexibility-externality tradeoff and the free-riding problem.
We assume that each exporting country has the option to participate in negotiations to set a cap on the applied tariff of any importing country. Each exporting country that joins the negotiations will have to contribute to the compensations that are made to the importing country in exchange for its tariff concessions. Any concessions from the importing country, however, will be extended to all countries regardless of their participation in negotiations. Therefore, an exporting country would decide to join negotiations only if its gain from further tariff binding cuts that are induced by its participation is at least as large as the compensations that it has to make if it participates. Moreover, we assume that the participating countries maximize their own expected joint welfare and, thus, face the same flexibilityexternality tradeoff that is considered in the tariff-cap models.
Under an optimal binding agreement, tariff lines may be divided into weak binding and strong binding. If ToT effects are sufficiently weak or the free-riding problem is sufficiently severe, the optimal tariff binding is weak as it provides unilateral flexibility to the government through tariff overhang. For sectors with stronger ToT effects and milder free-riding problems, the optimal binding is strong and, thus, no tariff overhang will be observed.
Our main results relate negotiated binding rates to Import Market Power (IMP) and the severity of the free-riding problem. First, we find that tariff binding rates among weakly-bound sectors are decreasing in IMP and increasing in the severity of free-riding. The negative impact of IMP on the optimal tariff binding is due to the trade-off between flexibility and externality: Since the efficiency cost of providing flexibility increases with the level of IMP, it is optimal to provide less trade policy flexibility to the governments in sectors with greater IMP.
Second, we find that in strongly-bound sectors, the binding rates are increasing in IMP if and only if the free-riding problem exists. Moreover, as the severity of free-riding problem increases, the relationship between negotiated tariffs and IMP becomes more positive. The intuition behind these results are similar to the one provided by LM: When some countries choose to free ride rather than to participate in tariff cut negotiations, the ToT effects will not be neutralized by the participating countries. The non-monotonic relationships between negotiation tariffs and IMP that are identified by our theory provide important guidelines for our empirical analysis of tariffs. In particular, the theory suggests that the effect of IMP must be different for weak and strong tariff bindings. In our empirical specifications, therefore, we estimate the ToT effects on two separate subsamples of weakly-and strongly-bound sectors. Using the tariff binding data from the WTO and various proxies for countries' import market power in a product, we find that negotiated tariffs and IMP show a negative association for strongly-bound tariff lines and zero to slightly positive association for strongly-bound sectors. The above empirical findings are in contrast to that of Ludema and Mayda (2013) (henceforth, LM) , who report a monotonically increasing relationship between negotiated tariffs and a measure of IMP. The difference between our results are primarily due to the use of different proxies for IMP and negotiated tariffs. 2 As their main measure of IMP, LM use the degree of product differentiation, while we use the estimated inverse of the foreign export-supply elasticity. 3 Moreover, as their main measure of negotiated tariffs, LM use applied tariffs, which are different from negotiated tariffs in a substantial fraction of the tariff lines.
We argue that LM's finding that tariffs are increasing in the degree of product differentiation reveals the role of Ramsey Taxation, rather than ToT effects, in trade agreements. To see this, note that the degree of product differentiation is a direct measure of demand elasticity such that products with a lower degree of differentiation have a higher demand elasticity. Moreover, as we know from political-economy models such as Grossman and Helpman (1995) , politically optimal tariffs are lower in products with more elastic demand. This result reflects a simple Ramsey Taxation argument in political-economy trade models: As also pointed out by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) , in products with a higher demand elasticity, it is more costly for the government to transfer welfare to producers by means of taxing imports. Therefore, politically optimal import tariffs must be higher in products with a greater degree of product differentiation. 4 The findings of this paper provide further confirmation for Bagwell and Staiger's (2011) claim that WTO negotiators, in effect, negotiated to limit the adverse ToT effects of unilateral trade policy. The additional insight from this paper is that in sectors with a lower degree of ToT externality, trade negotiations left room for unilateral flexibility and, hence, did not eliminate the ToT effects completely. Importantly, we also find that the failure to eliminate ToT effects does not seem to be driven by the free-riding problem. In addition to limiting the ToT externality of unilateral trade policy, tariff-cut negotiations could also limit the ability of governments to use trade policy to "delocate" production from foreign countries to home. 5 As 3 For robustness check, we also use world import shares and import volumes as alternative measures of import market power. 4 Also note that Product Differentiation Index does not vary across countries and it surpasses any determinants of import market power that emanate from the size of imports. 5 For an in-depth discussion of various goals that trade agreements may achieve, see elaborated by Ossa (2011) , the GATT/WTO negotiations, and especially the principle of reciprocity used in the negotiations, could be interpreted as an attempt to eliminate inefficient policies that are aimed at replacing imports with domestic production. In practice, the ability of the governments to delocate production is likely to be correlated with their ability to manipulate their ToT. Therefore, it would be difficult to empirically disentangle the ToT and delocation effects. Nevertheless, to the degree that ToT and delocation effects are correlated, our empirical results may also indicate the tradeoff between flexibility and delocation externality in tariff binding negotiations. The MFN clause is one of the pillars of the world trading system that has far-reaching implications. In addition to the free-riding problems that it may cause, the MFN clause could discourage multilateral negotiations and lead nations to pursue preferential trade agreements that could cause further inefficiencies due to trade diversion. The MFN clause, however, does not necessarily reduce the level of tariff liberalization. Under an alternative theoretical framework with asymmetric countries and private information, McCalman (2002) shows that a multilateral trading system that is governed by an MFN clause may lead to more liberalization compared to a system without the MFN clause. Saggi (2004 Saggi ( , 2009 ); Saggi and Yildiz (2005) also find potential gains and losses for negotiating under the MFN restriction when markets are imperfectly competitive. The overall effect of the MFN clause, therefore, is an empirical question that we address in this paper. This paper highlights the existence of unilateral flexibility, i.e., tariff overhang, in the WTO and its implication for the variation of tariff commitments across sectors and countries. 6 There are, however, various other contingent flexibility measures-such as that have likely affected the structure of tariff commitments under the WTO. Moreover, there is potentially a substitutability between tariff overhang and contingent protection measures.
For example, Beshkar and Bond (2017) show that, theoretically, the avail- Maggi (2014) , Grossman (2016) and Bagwell et al. (2016) . 6 Several studies, including Estevadeordal et al. (2008) and Bown (2014) , confirm that countries use the policy flexibility provided by tariff overhang to adjust their applied tariffs unilaterally.
ability of an escape clause leads to lower tariff binding commitments in sectors with greater import market power. Various empirical works provide evidence for the substitutability of alternative flexibility measures: Prusa and Li (2009) show that the use of antidumping measures are inversely related to the existence of tariff overhang. Similarly, Kuenzel (2017) show that a WTO dispute is more likely to arise in sectors with lower tariff overhangs. Finally, the empirical analysis of Bown and Crowley (2013) suggest that the ToT effects may influence the decision to adopt contingent protection measures.
After laying out our basic economic environment in Section 2, we introduce our model of negotiated tariffs in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the data and proxies that we use. In section 5, we present our empirical methodology and findings. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
The Basic Environment
In this section, we introduce a model of trade agreement under political uncertainty and the free-riding problem caused by the GATT/WTO's nondiscrimination clause, also known as Most-Favored Nation (MFN) Clause. We first briefly discuss the existing terms of trade models of tariff negotiations that emphasize the role of uncertainty and free-riding problem, respectively. We then offer a hybrid model that incorporates both of these issues.
Trade agreements are often viewed as a solution to the inefficiencies arising from noncooperative policymaking. Trade policy could be used to take advantage of the collective IMP of their domestic consumers visa-vis foreign suppliers. To be specific, an import tariff improves a country's terms of trade by depressing the world price of the imports, while generating a negative externality on the exporting countries. As argued by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) , remedying the ToT externality is the sole benefit of trade agreements within a wide range of neoclassical trade models.
Consider an importing country, henceforth Home, with the following political welfare function in a given product, k:
and an exporting country with the following welfare function in product k:
where S(p), Π(p), and m(p) are the consumer surplus, the producer surplus, and the import demand function, respectively, and and * indicates the corresponding variables for the exporting country. Moreover, the political parameter, θ, is the extra weight that the government assigns to the producer surplus compared to tariff revenues and consumer surplus.
Optimal noncooperative tariff of Home solves t N (θ) = arg max
which is implicitly given by
is the inverse of the Foreign export supply elasticity,
y is the product of the home import demand elasticity and the import penetration ratio. The noncooperative tariff, therefore, is increasing in the importing country's IMP, ω. Moreover, at the presence of political preferences towards producers, i.e., if θ > 0, the noncooperative tariff is decreasing in the product's elasticity of demand. The latter relationship is akin to the Ramsey taxation idea: transferring welfare from consumers to producers is more costly the more elastic is the demand for that product. Therefore, the optimal tariff is decreasing in import demand elasticity.
The jointly efficient tariffs, i.e., the tariff rate that maximizes the joint welfare of the importing and the exporting countries, is the solution to t E (θ) = arg max V(t;θ) + V * (t). Solving this problem yields the efficient tariff
which is independent of the importing IMP, ω. Therefore, under an efficient trade agreement, any variation in negotiated tariffs should be independent of the variation in IMP and must solely reflect the preferences of the governments for income distribution and the cost of transfers as determined by demand elasticity and import penetration embodied in η.
The theoretical finding that efficiently-negotiated tariffs are independent of countries' IMP hinges on two key assumptions: 1) negotiations are perfectly efficient; and 2) there is no uncertainty about the trade policy preferences of the governments. In the next section, we relax both of these assumptions and show how ToT effects will affect the level of negotiated tariffs.
Multilateral Tariff Negotiations under Political

Uncertainty and the MFN Rule
The flexibility and the free-riding models of negotiated tariffs generate opposing predictions regarding the role of terms of trade effects in tariff negotiations. Nevertheless, these models are not mutually exclusive in the sense that the forces identified in the two models could be at play simultaneously. In this section, we develop a model of multilateral liberalization that takes into account both the desire for flexibility and the role that the MFN rule play in negotiations.
As in Amador and Bagwell (2013) and Beshkar, Bond, and Rho (2015) (henceforth, BBR), we assume that tariff commitments are in the form of caps on the applied tariffs and that the political parameter θ is drawn from a probability distribution, f (θ). We extend these models to a multi-country setting by making two additional assumptions. First, applied tariffs must satisfy the MFN rule. Second, the negotiated tariff bindings maximize the joint welfare of the importing country and the exporting countries that participate in negotiations.
The basic premise of the MFN-induced free-riding model is as follows. Some exporting countries may prefer to stay out of negotiations since the MFN rule allows them to receive the benefit of tariff cuts negotiated by other countries without having to offer any concessions in return. We let P and φ(P), respectively, denote the set of countries that participate in the negotiations and the fraction of the importing country's imports in this product that are come from these countries. Due to the free-riding problem φ(P) < 1. Moreover, the more severe the free riding problem is the lower is φ(P). For brevity, we henceforth use φ instead of φ(P).
As demonstrated by LM, the severity of the free-riding problem depends on the distribution of the export volumes from different countries: the more dispersed is the volume of exports the greater is the free-riding problem since most countries benefit little from negotiations. In contrast, if most of the export is originated from a small number of countries, the importing country will face more aggressive demands for liberalization and, thus, the negotiated tariffs will be lower. Therefore, we follow LM's finding and assume that φ(P) is decreasing in the degree of exporter concentration.
Optimal Binding
We assume that the negotiated binding for a given product of an importing country maximizes the joint welfare of the importing country and the participating exporters, P. Therefore, the optimal tariff binding, denoted by t B (P), is the solution to the following expected welfare maximization problem:
where V * j is the welfare of the exporting country j in this product, and θ B is implicitly defined by t B ≡ t N (θ B ).
The first integral in (3) is the expected joint welfare of the participat-ing countries when the unilaterally optimal tariff is lower than the binding, t N (θ) < t B . Therefore, in this region, where, θ < θ B , the importing country imposes its unilaterally optimal tariff, and there will be a positive tariff overhang. The second integral is the expected joint welfare of the countries for θ > θ B , in which case the applied tariff is equal to the binding.
, where φ ≡ φ (P) is the share of trade originating from the participating countries, the FOC of the optimization problem 3 will be given by:
Using the properties of the welfare functions, the first-order condition (FOC) for optimality may be written as
where, η ≡ ǫz, and ǫ ≡ −p
m is demand elasticity and z = m s is the import penetration ratio. 7 The left-hand side (LHS) of the FOC (4) is the marginal cost of tariff for the joint welfare of the importing country and the participating exporters, which is increasing in t. Moreover, this expression is increasing in the fraction of the total imports that comes from the participating exporters, φ, and decreasing in ω, if φ < 1. The right-hand side (RHS) of the FOC 4 is the marginal benefit of an increase in tariff, which is increasing in (indepen-
. The second-order condition for maximization is satisfied if the LHS crosses the RHS from below.
The maximization problem yields a corner solution if LHS crosses RHS ω ω 
or, equivalently,
This condition indicates that a corner solution arises if the interaction of IMP and the share of trade by participating exporters is sufficiently large.
At a corner solution, the optimal binding is increasing in IMP, but this increase is slower the higher is φ. At an interior solution, an increase in ω shifts down both the LHS and RHS. A downward shift in the RHS tends to reduce the optimal binding, while a downward shift in the LHS tends to increase the optimal binding. The rate of the shift in RHS is slower the larger is φ. In particular, when φ = 1, RHS becomes invariant to ω. Therefore, there must exist a threshold value of φ above which the net effect of an increase in ω on optimal binding is negative.
Proposition 1. (i) If
, there will be no tariff overhang under the optimal tariff binding, which is given by t B =
. Moreover, if φ < 1, the optimal tariff binding will be increasing in ω and this correlation diminishes as φ increases.
(
, there exists a local optimum under which tariff overhang is positive for some states of the world, θ. Moreover, for a sufficiently large φ < 1, the optimal tariff binding is decreasing in ω and this correlation strengthens as φ increases.
The first part of this Proposition states that when IMP is sufficiently large, the optimal binding is strong, i.e., no positive tariff overhang arises under any state of the world. This result, as noted by BBR, reflects the trade-off between flexibility and terms of trade manipulation. Moreover, it states that under strong binding there is a positive correlation between the negotiated binding rates and the importing country's IMP. This result reflects the idea that at the presence of the free-riding problem, the negotiated agreement does not eliminate the importer's ToT effect on the choice of tariffs.
The second part of this Proposition states that when IMP is relatively low, the relationship between the optimal tariff binding and IMP depends on exporter's participation rate in negotiations, measured by φ. In particular, for a sufficiently high rate of participation, optimal tariff binding is declining in IMP. For sufficiently low φ, this relationship is ambiguous. Nevertheless, for all values of φ, the relationship between the optimal binding and IMP will be more negative the higher is φ.
Data
Data on Applied and Negotiated Tariffs
We use the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) for data on MFN tariff binding and applied tariff rates.
A natural choice of data for negotiated tariffs is the MFN binding rates that were negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Since the inception of the WTO in 1995, the MFN binding rates for original members have remained virtually unchanged. As their main measure of negotiated tariffs, LM use ap-plied tariffs. However, a central message of this paper is that due to the existence of tariff overhangs that vary substantially across sectors, using applied tariff rates to proxy for negotiated tariffs could be misleading.
To calculate overhang status of each industry, we use the MFN applied tariff rates from 1995 to 2007. 8 We label a tariff line as strong binding if there is no positive tariff overhang in any year between 1995 and 2007. Unbound sectors, i.e., sectors for which no tariff caps were negotiated, are dropped from the sample. 9 The remaining sectors, are labeled as weak binding.
Measures of Import Market Power
The main explanatory variable in our analysis is Import Market Power (IMP). One of the empirical challenges in testing theories of tariff choices is to find a measure of IMP. Several measures of IMP have been suggested and used in the literature including the inverse of the foreign export elasticity (IFEE), import volume, share of the world imports, and product differentiation. These alternative measures are significantly correlated in our data.
Inverse of the Foreign Export Elasticity (IFEE)
As our main measure of import market power, we use the inverse of the foreign export elasticity for each product. We use the estimates of IFEE for six-digit HS products provided by Nicita et al. (2018) . As pointed out by Broda et al. (2008) and Nicita et al., elasticity measures are usually imprecisely estimated. Moreover, these elasticities are potentially affected by the existing tariffs and, thus, any regression of negotiated tariffs on IFEE may suffer from an endogeneity problem. 10 8 We confirmed that less restrictive definitions of week binding generate similar results. 9 Theoretically, unbound sectors could be considered as sectors for which an arbitrarily high tariff binding is negotiated. Including unbound sectors in our regressions slightly increases the significance of our results.
10 Soderbery (2015) also points out that these elasticity measures might overestimate the To address the endogeneity of IFEE, we follow Nicita et al. by using two instrumental variables, namely, the weighted-sum of import demand elasticities in the rest-of-the-world and the world's export supply elasticities. 11
While correlated with IFEE estimates, these instruments are unlikely to be affected by the trade policy of a given importing country.
To mitigate the problem of imprecisely estimated IFEE measures, we follow the previous literature (Broda et al. 2008, Ludema and Mayda 2013, and Nicita et al.) by using a categorical variable that is equal to 1 for high values of IFEE and zero otherwise.
Import Volume and World Import Share
As alternative measures of IMP, we use import volume (as in Bagwell and Staiger 2011) and the share of a country in that product's world trade (as in BBR and Beshkar and Bond 2017). In our regressions, we use log of these variables as well as a categorical variable that indicates high vs. low import volumes or shares.
To address the endogeneity of trade volumes as a measure of IMP, we use log of GDP and the interaction of log of GDP per Capita and Product Differentiation Index as instrumental variables. GDP would naturally affect the volume of imports in a sector without being significantly affected by tariffs in those sectors. Moreover, the interaction of GDP per Capita and Product Differentiation Index captures, in a rough way, the fact that richer countries tend to import relatively more in highly differentiated products. Compared to IFEE, a drawback of import volume (and the corresponding world shares) as a measure of IMP is that it suppresses the information about variation of supply elasticity across products. Nevertheless, in comparison to IFEE, it better captures the variation of IMP across countries in the same product category. 12 Therefore, the IMP measures based on trade true level of export supply elasticity. Though it may be important for calculating gains from trade, overestimated elasticities do not introduce a major problem for our analysis as we rely on the ranking-rather than the size-of export supply elasticities. 11 Estimates of import demand elasticity are obtained from Kee et al. (2008) 12 The estimates of IFEE do not accurately capture the variation of IMP across countries.
volumes should provide a useful robustness check for our results.
Product Differentiation Index
Product differentiation Index-a binary variable provided by Rauch (1999)-is used by LM as their main measure of IMP. This choice is based on the argument that, other things equal, the residual supply of the foreign country is more elastic the more elastic is the foreign country's demand for the product. By construction, this measure does not vary across countries and does not capture the effect of import size or the elasticity of foreign supply on IMP. A major problem with using product differentiation as a measure of IMP is that this measure affects the optimal level of tariff directly through a channel that is distinct from IMP.
In models with politically motivated governments (as in Grossman and Helpman 1995) , the optimal non-cooperative and cooperative tariffs are both decreasing in demand elasticity. This is essentially a Ramsey taxation argument: the consumption loss associated with an income transfer to the interest groups is higher in products with more elastic demand. Since higher product differentiation is associated with lower demand elasticity, the Ramsey taxation argument implies that the optimal tariff should be higher for differentiated products. Therefore, it is not justifiable to attribute the positive association between negotiated tariffs and product differentiation to the effect of ToT on trade agreements.
Exporter Concentration Index (ECI)
LM suggest that a measure of exporter concentration for each productcountry pair could be used to proxy for the degree of free-riding problem For example, in the estimates provided by Broda et al. (2008) , the median IFEE for China is lower than that of Paraguay and Algeria, and in par with that of Bolivia and Ukraine. This comparison is very counter-intuitive given that China is a much larger economy. Therefore, IFEE estimates seem to capture more accurately the variation of IMP across products within each country. in tariff cut negotiations. Following LM, we calculate an Exporter Concentration Index akin to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for each HS six-digit product k imported to country i, namely,
where, M ji,k is the volume of exports from country j to country i in sector k, WTO i is the set of all WTO members excluding i's FTA partners, and MFN i is the set of all trading partners of importer i with and MFN status excluding i's FTA partners. In other words, WTO i is the set of all countries that would have been able to enter negotiation with i for MFN tariff cuts, and MFN i is the set of all countries that would benefit from MFN tariff cuts of country i. 13
It is appropriate to add a caveat in regard to interpreting ECI ik as capturing the role of the principal-supplier rule and the free-riding problem in negotiations: The calculated Exporter Concentration Index is negatively and highly correlated with all measures of Import Market Power. The high correlation should be expected as larger markets could naturally accommodate a greater number of firms and varieties. However, due to its high correlation with I MP, ECI may confound the ToT and the free-riding effects.
Political Stability
We use the World Bank Governance Index, specifically the Political Stability and Absence of Violence measure, to control for country-specific political factors that may affect governments' preference for flexibility. The Governance Index is calculated by aggregating data on governments from a variety of sources including consumer and firm sur-13 FTA members are defined as any country pair with an Economic Integration Agreement (EIA) classification number between 3 and 6, as calculated by Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) . A value of 3 corresponds to an FTA, with higher values corresponding to a customs union, a common market, and an economic union. As a robustness check FTA is amended to include PTAs, values of 1 or 2 in the EIA database. Here PTAs are either two-way agreements where tariffs are not fully eliminated, or a one-way preferential agreement, such as those involving GSP preferences. Trade data is from UN Comtrade at the six-digit level for 1994.
veys and expert opinions. The construction of the index makes use of 35 data sources from 32 organizations. Our results are robust to various political stability measures provided by the World Bank and the Economist Intelligence Unit.
Evidence
To test the role of ToT effects and the free-riding problem in tariff cut negotiations, we use estimate the following equation that is suggested by LM:
In this equation, i and k are importer and industry indexes, respectively, t B ik is the tariff binding rate, I MP i is a measure of import market power, and ECI ik is the exporter concentration index. Other sector and country-level variables are included in Γ ik , Φ i , and Ψ k . In all regressions, we include a twodigit industry dummy and either a country dummy or a country-level index of Political Stability. We also control for the effect of including ECI ik and the ratio of within-FTA trade to import demand elasticity (FTAShare ik /µ ik , as suggested by LM), and the Product Differentiation Index (PDI). Finally, we also run our regressions on various subsamples of countries including the original WTO members and the countries included in LM. 14 Proposition 1 states that the MFN-driven free-riding concerns and the flexibility-externality tradeoff have opposing effects on the relationship between import market power and negotiated tariffs. In particular, other things equal, the free-riding problem predicts a positive estimate for β 1 . Meanwhile, the flexibility-externality tradeoff predicts a non-monotonic relationship: negotiated tariffs must be decreasing in (independent of) IMP for weakly bound (strongly bound) sectors. It is, therefore, an empirical question whether free-riding concerns or the flexibility-externality tradeoff dominate in practice. Notes: 1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . 2 All regressions include a two-digit industry dummy and either a country dummy or a country-level index of Political Stability.
Our point of departure from LM's empirical work is to take into account the predicted non-monotonic relationship between I MP and negotiated tariffs. 15 As suggested by Proposition 1, in order to address the non-monotonic relationship between I MP and negotiated tariffs, we estimate Equation 6 on two separate subsamples, namely, the subsamples of weakly-and stronglybound sectors. For the sake of comparison, we also estimate this equation on all bound sectors. For all the regressions, we provide results using various Import Market Power measures, various controls, and both with and without Instrumental Variables.
As reported in Tables 1 and 2 , the estimation of Equation 6 on the sample of weakly-bound sectors indicate that β 1 < 0, i.e., the effect of import market power (I MP ik ) on negotiated tariffs is negative and significant. The negative relationship between negotiated tariffs and import market power lends support to the theoretical finding that under an optimal agreement products with a greater ToT externality will be given a smaller degree of trade policy flexibility. Moreover, this result indicates that even if the free-riding concerns were a significant factor in negotiations, their effects had been dominated by the flexibility-externality tradeoff. Table 3 provides Tobit estimation results on the sample of strongly- 15 As we discussed in Section 4, our empirical work differs from LM also in the choice of proxies for import market power and negotiated tariffs. Notes: 1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, all estimated using a linear two stage GMM. 2 IFEE is instrumented with weighted-sum of import demand elasticity in the rest of the world and the world export supply elasticity. 3 Import Share is instrumented with both ln(GDP) and PDI*ln (GDP per Capita) bound sectors. 16 If free-riding effects are present, they must manifest themselves in the subsample of strongly-bound sectors. That is because within our model, the free-riding effects are the only cause of deviation from efficient tariffs in the sample of strongly-bound sectors. 17 In some specifications over the subsample of strongly bound sectors, we find a positive estimate of β 1 . However, this result is not robust and, hence, we could not provide strong empirical support for the effect of free-riding on negotiations.
The MFN-driven free-riding theory further predicts that β 2 must be negative, implying a milder free-riding problem in sectors where exporters are concentrated in fewer countries, i.e., a higher ECI ik . However, as can be seen in Tables 1-3 , the estimated sign and the statistical significance of β 2 is not consistent across different specifications. Therefore, we cannot find empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that products with more concentrated exporters have lower negotiated tariffs.
Finally, in Table 4 , we present the estimates of Equation 6 on the entire sample of sectors that are bound by a negotiated tariff cap. This regressions 16 A Tobit regression is the appropriate specification to use here since the subsample of strongly-bound sectors include sectors with a zero tariff binding. 17 Recall that the flexibility-externality tradeoff is operational only at an interior solution, at which there is positive flexibility, i.e., when the negotiated binding is weak. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, all estimated using an IV two stage tobit.
provide the most direct comparison with LM's results as they also run their regressions over the entire sample of industries without splitting them up into weakly-and strongly-bound sectors. As can be seen in Table 4 , the estimates of β 1 are negative and statistically significant. As in previous Tables, the estimates of β 2 are not consistent with the results of the free-riding theory, which predicts a negative sign for β 2 . The stark difference between our results and that of LM are mostly due to the difference between our measures of I MP. 18 In particular, while we use the inverse of foreign export supply elasticity as our main measure of import market power, they use Product Differentiation Index (PDI). However, as we argued in Section 4, PDI is primarily a measure of inverse demand elasticity, which is expected to be positively related to negotiated tariffs due to the Ramsey Taxation argument, rather than the optimum tariff argument. As can be seen in various columns of Tables 1-4, controlling for PDI does not overturn our results. Consistent with LM estimations, the estimated coefficients of of PDI in these regressions are positive and statistically significant.
In summary, our key empirical finding is that the flexibility-externality tradeoff could explain a substantial part of the variation in negotiated tar- 18 Another difference is that LM use applied tariffs as their main measure of negotiated tariffs. Nevertheless, we argue that binding rates are a more direct measure of negotiated tariffs. Moreover, the existence of substantial amount of tariff overhang in the WTO means that negotiated and applied tariffs diverge frequently. LM also generate and use a measure of sectoral politics that we do not have. iffs, while the free-riding problem appears to have a weak effect. In particular, we find that the predicted positive effect of free-riding problem on the negotiated tariff levels manifests itself in the data only if we isolate the much-larger and negative effects caused by the flexibility-externality tradeoff.
Conclusion
This paper aims to reconcile conflicting results in the literature concerning how ToT effects matter for tariff negotiations. As articulated by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) , the first-best trade agreements eliminate the ToT effects. Various empirical studies, including Ludema and Mayda (2013) , Beshkar et al. (2015) ; Beshkar and Bond (2017) , and Nicita et al. (2018) , show that the real-world trade agreements deviate from this predicted first-best. However, these papers generate conflicting views about why the first-best is not achieved in negotiations and how ToT effects shaped the existing trade agreements. In this paper we design and test a model that takes into account the uncertainty about future political-economy preferences and the MFN-induced free-riding problem in tariff negotiations. We predict that if there is sig-nificant uncertainty about future political-economy preferences, the governments tend to negotiate lower tariffs in products with larger ToT effects. Conversely, if the free-riding problem is a major factor in trade negotiations, tariffs tend to be larger in products with a greater ToT effect.
Testing this model using the WTO negotiated tariffs, we find overwhelming support for the view that uncertainty about future politicaleconomy preferences have shaped the WTO agreement on tariffs. In particular, we find that negotiated tariffs are inversely related to the degree of the ToT effects in a product. This relationship reflects an important tradeoff that the negotiators face: A more stringent tariff binding reduces the negative ToT externality but at the same time it reduces the governments' ability to respond to uncertain political-economy shocks. Therefore, the weaker are the ToT effects, the greater is the value of providing flexibility to the governments through higher negotiated tariffs. We also find that the freeriding problem might have a second-order effect on negotiated tariffs. We find little evidence that tariffs have been negotiated harder in products with more concentrated exporters.
